Must We Become God to Be 'Holy'?
我们必须成为上帝才能“神圣”吗?
Unveiling the Puzzle of “Finite Holy Beings” in Kantian Ethics
Section titled “Unveiling the Puzzle of “Finite Holy Beings” in Kantian Ethics”The Impossible Standard: Why Is Being a “Good Person” So Hard?
Section titled “The Impossible Standard: Why Is Being a “Good Person” So Hard?”Imagine someone who does the right thing without ever struggling. They don’t have to fight against laziness, greed, or selfish impulses. For them, helping a neighbor is as natural as breathing.
In Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, this moral perfection usually belongs only to God — a “holy will” that necessarily acts morally. For us mortals, morality is a struggle; it requires Virtue, which Kant defines as the moral strength to overcome natural desires.
But is the gap between “human virtue” and “holiness” truly unbridgeable?
Recent academic research has reignited a fascinating debate buried deep in Kant’s texts: the concept of “endliche heilige Wesen” (finite holy beings). This obscure phrase hints at a special class of beings who are finite and created like us, yet morally perfect like God.
If such beings are possible — even if only in theory — it completely changes our understanding of our own moral potential. Are we destined to spend eternity in struggle, or is “holiness” actually within the horizon of finite creatures?
Let’s dive into this philosophical detective story.
The Classic Kantian Dichotomy: Virtue vs. Holiness
Section titled “The Classic Kantian Dichotomy: Virtue vs. Holiness”To understand why “finite holy beings” are so controversial, we first need to know the rules of the game. For decades, Kant scholars have defined moral subjects based on a strict binary.
On one side is the infinite holy being (God).
God has no body, feels no hunger, no jealousy, and no fatigue. Because God has no “sensuous inclinations” (fleshly desires) that conflict with duty, God cannot even be tempted. God is “holy” because his will is perfectly aligned with the moral law.
On the other side are finite rational beings (humans).
We are rational, so we know what we should do. But we are also animals; we crave pleasure and comfort. Because of this conflict, our moral life is a battle. When we do the right thing against our will, we demonstrate virtue.
Kant famously said: “Virtue is moral disposition in struggle.”
A Statistically Brutal Reality
Section titled “A Statistically Brutal Reality”If you flip through a standard Kantian philosophy textbook, 99% of them will tell you that humans can never be holy. We can only infinitely approach it. We are stuck in an “infinite progress” toward perfection but never actually arrive. This view, while logical, leaves us with a depressing conclusion: true moral harmony is impossible for any being with a body.
The Outlier: What Kind of Being Does “Finite Holy Being” Point To?
Section titled “The Outlier: What Kind of Being Does “Finite Holy Being” Point To?”Recent scholarship points out that in specific texts like The Metaphysics of Morals and lecture notes, Kant seems to contradict his own dualism. He uses the phrase “endliche heilige Wesen” (finite holy beings).
What kind of being is this? It suggests a third category outside the binary:
- Finite: They are created, limited, and may even have bodies or a specific nature.
- Holy: They do not experience the “drag” of illicit desires. They do not need “virtue” (constraint) because they have no desire to be bad.
The most common candidates for this category are angels or the theological figure of the “Son of God” (Jesus). If Jesus is considered “finite” (born as a man) yet “holy” (sinless), he breaks the rule that “having a body equals having moral struggle.”
Why Does This Matter to You?
Section titled “Why Does This Matter to You?”If a finite being can be holy, it proves that finitude does not necessarily lead to evil. Just because you aren’t God doesn’t mean you are born to be torn apart by temptation. This opens a door for us: perhaps “struggle” is not a permanent feature of existence, but a feature of our current specific state.
Rethinking “Will” and “Choice”
Section titled “Rethinking “Will” and “Choice””This debate forces us to look closely at how we make choices. Source texts argue that we need to distinguish between “choice” (Willkür) and “legislative will” (Wille).
For a virtuous human, they must use their Willkür to choose the moral law, often fighting their desires. But for a finite holy being, their Willkür might be naturally attuned to the moral law.
It’s like the difference between a professional musician and a beginner:
- The Beginner (Virtuous Human): Knows the right notes but must concentrate intensely and force fingers to move correctly. It is a struggle.
- The Master (Finite Holy Being): Plays the perfect notes effortlessly. They are still human (finite), but their performance is flawless (holy).
A Counter-Intuitive Insight
Section titled “A Counter-Intuitive Insight”We usually think of “overcoming temptation” as the highest form of morality. We praise the person who finds a wallet, wants to keep it, but eventually returns it.
However, Kant hints at something surprising: the person who returns the wallet without even a momentary desire to steal is in a state of “holiness.”
The existence of “finite holy beings” suggests that struggle is not the core of morality — it is only a symptom of our imperfection. The goal is not to fight forever; the goal is to reach a state where fighting is no longer necessary.
Bridging the Gap: From Xunzi’s “Status Quo” to Mencius’s “Potential”
Section titled “Bridging the Gap: From Xunzi’s “Status Quo” to Mencius’s “Potential””This debate over “virtue” vs. “holiness” has a striking resonance for readers familiar with Eastern philosophy. It reminds us of the famous disagreement between Mencius and Xunzi on human nature during the Warring States period.
We can use this relationship to re-examine Kant’s puzzle:
Xunzi and “Virtue”: Defining Humans by Status Quo
Section titled “Xunzi and “Virtue”: Defining Humans by Status Quo”Xunzi argued that “human nature is evil” — not that humans are born criminals, but that their current status is filled with chaotic natural desires (“liking profit and hating harm”).
- In Xunzi’s view, goodness is “artifice” (wei — the result of human effort). We need rituals and laws to “correct” our nature.
- This perfectly maps to the standard Kantian concept of “Virtue”: we are defined as beings who must constantly struggle with our own desires. If we stop the struggle (“transform nature through artifice”), we slide into chaos.
Mencius and “Finite Holiness”: Defining Humans by Potential
Section titled “Mencius and “Finite Holiness”: Defining Humans by Potential”In contrast, Mencius argued that “human nature is good,” defining humans by their potential. He saw moral sprouts (siduan) deeply rooted in us.
- In Mencius’s view, if we fully “extend” these potentials, moral action will no longer be a constraint but as natural as water flowing downhill.
- This echoes Kant’s “finite holy being”: a being that, though finite, has a will completely harmonized with the moral law.
What is the conclusion?
Traditional Kantian interpretations often turn Kant into a strict “Xunzi-ist,” believing humans are doomed to live in an eternal tug-of-war between desire and duty, relying only on willpower (wei) to maintain morality.
However, the revival of the “finite holy being” concept suggesting a “Mencian” horizon in Kant’s philosophy: Our ultimate goal is not perpetual suppression, but transformation and sublimation. That state of “holiness” without struggle is not just a privilege of angels, but the ultimate direction of our human potential.
Conclusion: The Horizon of Perfection
Section titled “Conclusion: The Horizon of Perfection”The debate over “finite holy beings” might look like hair-splitting about angels, but it touches the core of the human experience. It asks: are we defined by our limitations, or by our potential?
Kant’s admission that a being can be both finite and holy offers a glimmer of hope. It suggests that moral perfection doesn’t just belong to an abstract, infinite God. In some mysterious way, this state is compatible with created existence. We might be works in progress, struggling with our “virtue” today, but the blueprint for “holiness” lies deep within our rational nature.
So, the next time you feel that doing the right thing is a struggle, ask yourself: Are you fighting just to fight, or are you working toward a state of peace where the fight is no longer needed?
揭秘康德伦理学中“有限神圣存在者”的谜题
Section titled “揭秘康德伦理学中“有限神圣存在者”的谜题”不可能的标准:为什么做一个“好人”如此艰难?
Section titled “不可能的标准:为什么做一个“好人”如此艰难?”想象一下这样一个人:他做正确的事从来不需要挣扎。他不需要与懒惰、贪婪或自私的冲动通过斗争。对他来说,帮助邻居就像呼吸一样自然。
在康德的哲学中,这种道德上的完美通常只属于上帝——一种必然在道德上行动(必然根据绝对命令行动)“神圣意志”(holy will)。而对于我们这些凡人来说,道德是一场斗争;它需要德性(Virtue),康德将其定义为克服自然欲望的道德力量。
但是,“人类的德性”与“神圣性”之间的鸿沟真的无法逾越吗?
最近的学术研究重新点燃了一场深埋在康德文本中的迷人辩论:关于“endliche heilige Wesen”(有限神圣存在者)的概念。这个晦涩的短语暗示了一类特殊的存在:他们像我们一样是有限的、被创造的,但同时又像上帝一样在道德上是完美的。
如果这样的存在真的可能——哪怕只是在理论上——它将完全改变我们对自己道德潜能的理解。我们是注定要永远在挣扎中度过,还是说“神圣”的状态实际上处于有限生物的视界之内?
让我们潜入这个哲学侦探故事一探究竟。
经典的康德式二分:德性 vs. 神圣性
Section titled “经典的康德式二分:德性 vs. 神圣性”要理解为什么“有限神圣存在者”如此具有争议,我们首先得了解游戏规则。几十年来,康德学者们一直基于一种严格的二元对立来定义道德主体。
在这一边,是无限的神圣存在者(上帝)。
上帝没有身体,不会感到饥饿,不会嫉妒,也不会疲倦。因为上帝没有与义务相冲突的“感性偏好”(肉体欲望),所以上帝不可能受到诱惑。上帝之所以是“神圣”的,是因为他的意志与道德法则完美契合。
在那一边,是有限的理性存在者(人类)。
我们是理性的,所以我们知道应该做什么。但我们也是动物;我们渴望快乐和舒适。由于这种冲突,我们的道德生活是一场战斗。当我们违背自己的意愿去做正确的事时,我们展现了德性。
康德有一句名言:“德性是处于斗争中的道德意向。”
统计学上的残酷现实
Section titled “统计学上的残酷现实”如果你翻阅标准的康德哲学教科书,99% 的书都会告诉你,人类永远无法成为神圣的。我们只能无限接近它。我们陷入了通往完美的“无限进程”中,却永远无法真正抵达。
这种观点虽然合理,但却留给我们一个令人沮丧的结论:对于任何拥有身体的存在来说,真正的道德和谐是不可能的。
异常值:“有限神圣存在者”指向怎样的存在?
Section titled “异常值:“有限神圣存在者”指向怎样的存在?”刘作的论文在此处投下了一枚重磅炸弹。文本指出,在《道德形而上学》和讲座记录等特定文本中,康德似乎反驳了他自己的二元论。他使用了“endliche heilige Wesen”(有限神圣存在者)这一短语。
这个名词一个怎样的存在?其暗示了上述二元论以外的第三种类别:
- 有限的(Finite): 他们是被创造的、受限的,甚至可能拥有身体或某种特定的本性。
- 神圣的(Holy): 他们没有体验到非法欲望的“拖累”。他们不需要“德性”(强制),因为他们根本没有变坏的欲望。
这个类别最常见的候选者是天使,或者是神学形象中的“神子”(耶稣)。如果耶稣被认为是“有限的”(生而为人)但又是“神圣的”(无罪的),他就打破了“拥有身体等于拥有道德斗争”这一规则。
这与你何干?
Section titled “这与你何干?”如果一个有限的存在能够是神圣的,这就证明了有限性并不必然导致罪恶。 仅仅因为你不是上帝,并不意味着你生来就必须被诱惑撕裂。这为我们打开了一扇门:也许“挣扎”并不是存在的永久特征,而只是我们当前特定状态的一个特征。
3. 重新思考“意志”与“选择”
Section titled “3. 重新思考“意志”与“选择””这场辩论迫使我们仔细审视我们是如何做选择的。源文本认为,我们需要区分“选择能力/任意”(Willkür)和“立法的意志”(Wille)。
对于一个有德性的人类来说,他们必须使用他们的 Willkür 来选择道德法则,通常要与他们的欲望作斗争。但是对于一个有限神圣存在者来说,他们的 Willkür 可能天生就与道德法则相调谐。
这就好比专业音乐家与初学者的区别:
- 初学者(有德性的人): 知道正确的音符,但必须极度专注并强迫手指正确移动。这是一种挣扎。
- 大师(有限神圣存在者): 毫不费力地演奏出完美的音符。他们仍然是人类(有限的),但他们的演奏是完美无瑕的(神圣的)。
反直觉的洞见
Section titled “反直觉的洞见”我们通常认为“战胜诱惑”是道德的最高形式。我们赞美那个捡到钱包、想据为己有但最终归还的人。
然而,康德暗示了一些令人惊讶的事情:那个归还钱包却甚至从未动念想要偷窃的人,处于一种“神圣”的状态。
“有限神圣存在者”的存在表明,斗争并不是道德的核心——它只是我们不完美的症状。目标不是永远战斗;目标是达到一种不再需要战斗的境界。
4. 跨越鸿沟:从荀子的“现状”到孟子的“潜能”
Section titled “4. 跨越鸿沟:从荀子的“现状”到孟子的“潜能””这个关于“德性”与“神圣性”的争论,对于熟悉东方哲学的读者来说,会听到一种惊人的回响。它让我们想起了战国时期孟子与荀子关于人性的著名分歧。
我们可以用这对关系来重新审视康德的难题:
荀子与“德性”:从现状定义人
Section titled “荀子与“德性”:从现状定义人”荀子主张“性恶”,这并不是说人天生就是罪犯,而是说人的**现状(Current Status)**充满了混乱的自然欲望(“好利而恶害”)。
- 在荀子看来,善是“伪”(人为努力的结果)。我们需要通过礼法来“矫正”我们的本性。
- 这完美对应了康德标准的**“德性”**概念:我们被定义为需要不断与自身欲望斗争的存在。如果停止斗争(“化性起伪”),我们就会滑向堕落。
孟子与“有限的神圣性”:从潜能定义人
Section titled “孟子与“有限的神圣性”:从潜能定义人”相反,孟子主张“性善”,他是从人的**潜能(Potential)**来定义人的。他看到了深植于我们体内的道德萌芽(“四端”)。
- 在孟子看来,如果我们将这些潜能充分“扩充”,道德行动将不再是强制,而是像水流下山一样自然(“若火之始然,泉之始达”)。
- 这正呼应了康德的**“有限神圣存在者”**:一个虽然有限,但其意志已经与道德法则完全和谐一致的存在。
结论是什么?
传统的康德解读往往把康德变成了一个严格的“荀子主义者”,认为人类注定要在欲望与义务的永恒拉锯战中生存,只能依靠意志力(“伪”)来维持道德。
然而,“有限神圣存在者”概念的复兴表明,康德哲学中隐藏着一个“孟子式”的视界:我们的终极目标不是永远压抑(Suppress),而是转化与升华(Transform)。 那个无需挣扎的“神圣”状态,不仅是天使的特权,也是我们人性潜能的终极指向。
结语:完美的视界
Section titled “结语:完美的视界”关于“有限神圣存在者”的学术辩论可能看起来像是在天使和定义上钻牛角尖,但它触及了人类体验的核心。它追问的是:我们究竟是被我们的局限性所定义,还是被我们的潜能所定义?
康德承认一个存在者可以既是有限的又是神圣的,这提供了一线希望。它表明道德完美不仅仅属于抽象的、无限的上帝。在某种神秘的方式上,这种状态与被创造的存在是兼容的。我们可能是半成品,今天还在与我们的“德性”挣扎,但“神圣性”的蓝图就潜藏在我们理性本质的深处。
所以,下一次当你觉得做正确的事是一种挣扎时,问问你自己: 你是在为了战斗而战斗,还是在朝着一个不再需要战斗的和平境界努力?